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Paid Family and Medical Leave:
Cost and Coverage Estimates of Three Choices in Massachusetts
Background

including those related to pregnancy. Family leaves are for
bonding with a new child and caring for an ill relative.

The birth of a child, a cancer diagnosis, a hip replacement,
or serious illness of a parent, spouse or child. Each requires
a worker to take an extended, but temporary, period of time
off from work. Most workers will experience such an event
at some point in their life. Yet the United States is one of
the few countries in the world that does not have a national
policy on paid maternity leave and remains an outlier
among industrial counterparts without any guarantee
of paid parental and medical leave.1 Currently, six states
and Washington DC, however, have such paid family and
medical leave (PFML) programs or have recently enacted
them.2 Many other states have paid family and medical leave
legislation under consideration, including Massachusetts.
Paid family leave acknowledges the realities of today’s
workforce in which many workers struggle to balance work
and family, while paid medical leave reduces the economic
risk of being out of work for a serious, but short-term,
health condition by providing partial pay. Paid leave-taking
is associated with a host of positive health outcomes for
workers and their families, an increase in men’s time
engaging in parental care, and reductions in turnover costs
for employers.3

Policy Goals
One main policy goal of implementing a statewide paid
family and medical leave program is to efficiently extend
coverage to those who currently do not have any or sufficient
access to paid wage replacement and to reduce any short or
long-term employment penalties for workers who take shortterm leaves to have or bond with a new child or tend to their
own or a family member’s serious health condition. Another
policy goal is to structure a program in which costs ensure
that the benefits paid to eligible workers on leave provide
them with sufficient income to weather the temporary
break from employment but also to make sure that the
contributions that pay for the program are not too expensive
for workers or employers. This means that whichever
program Massachusetts adopts, the features should include:
1) broad-based, portable eligibility requirements; 2) a
sufficiently high maximum benefit payment as well as a high
wage replacement rate, especially for low-wage workers; 3) a
job-protected leave that is sufficiently long enough to cover
many short-term disabilities and to allow for bonding with a
new child; and 4) a non-experienced rated social insurance
program that is managed efficiently.

In states with paid leave programs, workers or both workers
and employers contribute to an insurance fund and eligible
employees draw from these funds when on leave.4 In states
without paid family and medical leave programs, the costs
associated with taking time off from work for a serious ownhealth condition, to bond with a new child, or to care for an
ill-relative are borne by individual workers who take those
leaves and their employers. A statewide paid leave program
will not cover all the costs of wage replacement for workers
on a family or medical leave, but the substantial portions
that are covered are spread across the entire covered
workforce and are available to all workers who meet the
eligibility requirements. In doing so, such a program reduces
the individual cost to all workers and employers and, at the
same time, reduces inequality among workers by covering
workers who did not have any wage replacement prior to a
program being established.

Each of the three programs proposed and analyzed here
satisfies these policy goals, but to different extents. Each sets
up a social insurance program with uniform contributions
from employers and employees; and each uses eligibility
requirements that are portable across Massachusetts
employers, ensures job guarantee for workers on leave,
and proposes sufficient maximum weeks for leaves. As
discussed below, the programs differ in terms of how long
someone must be employed and contributing to be eligible,
replacement levels and rates, and weeks for bonding and
caring leaves, which has differing effects on both coverage
and costs.
What follows are estimates of the cost of benefits paid,
number of leaves taken, leave lengths, and percent of
workers with wage-replacement for family and medical
leaves for the three proposed program using a sophisticated
simulator model (See box on p. 2 for details). No single paid
family and medical leave program will perfectly balance the
needs of workers and their employers as there is a tradeoff between coverage and costs. Yet, in our conclusion,
we offer a recommendation on how to combine elements
of the proposed programs on the policy table here in
Massachusetts that achieve the goal of sufficiently covering
workers while keeping costs at affordable levels.

This policy brief explores the costs and coverage of three
proposed paid family and medical leave programs for
Massachusetts. These are House Bill 2172, Senate Bill 1048,
and 2018 Initiative Petition C. Each of these proposed
programs establishes a contributory fund paid by employers
and employees, to be used for eligible workers when they are
out of work for their own serious health condition or that of
a family member, for pregnancy, or to bond with a new child.
The medical leaves considered are for own health reasons,
1

The ACM/IWPR Simulator and Behavior Parameters and Assumptions Used
All the estimates provided here come from the Albelda Clayton-Matthews/Institute for Women’s Policy
Research (ACM/IWPR) Paid Family and Medical Leave Simulator Model (September 2017 version). They do not
include costs associated with administering a program.5 The simulator relies on known leave-taking behavior
among workers contained in a 2012 United States Department of Labor (DOL) sponsored survey on family
and medical leaves6 and our own informed decision-making for unknown behavior (such as take-up rates).
Using the 2012 DOL survey, we estimate models of the likelihood of an individual taking an FMLA (Family
and Medical Leave Act) qualifying leave, and the length of that leave, based on employer pay, the demographic
characteristics of leave takers, and the need for a leave. We then use these models to simulate leave-taking,
employer costs, and program costs both with and without a state paid leave program, using sample
individuals from the five-year American Community Survey (ACS) for 2011-2015 for all employees working in
Massachusetts. These estimates are not sensitive to who pays for the program (i.e. if the revenue for benefits
are generated through employer or employee contributions or through tax revenues). Documentation on the
model is available at http://scholarworks.umb.edu/econ_faculty_pubs/41.
There are two types of parameters that must be specified to generate estimates from the simulator. One
identifies the paid leave policy. These policy parameters, as specified in the House and Senate bills and in
the Initiative Petition, include the wage replacement rate, maximum weeks of leave, maximum benefit level,
waiting period, and eligibility requirements. The other type of parameters designates behaviors beyond those
that can be estimated from the DOL survey. These behavioral parameters provide the simulator with decision
rules about how people might behave when faced with the option of using a statewide paid family and
medical leave (PFML) program. The key behavioral parameters include information about: take-up rates (the
percentage of eligible leave takers who use a paid leave program); length of leave once on a program;7 and use
of a program if an employer already provides leave payments that are more generous than the PFML program.
Using the simulator to estimate actual leaves and lengths in California and New Jersey generated some of
the information used to calibrate take-up rates and behavior parameters regarding length of PFML program
leaves.8 The take-up rates we use for these estimates are 40% for own health; 95% for pregnancy-related and
new-child bonding leaves; and 5% for ill relative leaves. The variation in these take-up rates reflect the type of
leave taken (e.g. virtually all mothers who give birth take time off; most own-health leaves are short; far fewer
use a program for ill relative leaves as there may be many caretaker substitutes and leave time required is
less predictable); and the nature of DOL survey questions about pregnancy and bonding leaves. Take-up rates
for own health and ill relative leaves will likely increase over time as employers and employees become more
familiar with the program.
The simulator imposes “rationality” on leave takers. That means that weekly program benefits must equal
or exceed their next best alternative for someone to choose to use the PFML program when taking a leave.
Therefore, if an employer’s wage replacement exceeds the amount of the program benefit, the leave taker
chooses not to participate in the program. However, it is likely that some employers who already provide full
wage replacement would encourage employees to use the PFML program and then “top-off” program benefits
to reach full wage replacement. We have built in a behavioral parameter that allows us to input a percentage
of employees with full wage replacement who would use a program based on a minimum number of weeks of
leave taken. For these estimations, the simulator is directed to randomly select 50 percent of all leavers with
full wage replacement taking a leave of four weeks (20 days) or more to use the state-mandated program for
as long as the leave is eligible for wage replacement.9
The data passed through the simulator come from the U.S. sample of 2011-2015 ACS 5-year Public Use Microdata
Samples (PUMS), culling all individuals employed in Massachusetts, regardless of state of residence.10
Local and federal government employees are excluded from these estimates as state legislation precludes
mandating the additional cost that would accompany covering local government workers while federal
legislation precludes states from subjecting federal employees to state paid family and medical laws. There
are 3,534,331 non-federal and non-municipal government workers employed in Massachusetts, including
all self-employed workers (9.8% of all the covered workforce) as each of the three programs estimated here
allows self-employed workers to opt into the PFML program (rather than be excluded from or be required to
participate). Their inclusion here may bias the results by overestimating the number of leaves taken as not all
self-employed workers will opt in, but underestimating the length of leaves as those who do use the program
may have a higher likelihood to need and use a paid leave program than those who do not opt in.
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Program Parameters

family leaves and similar to the payroll contributions used
to help fund Medicare, subjects all wages earned to payroll
contributions. All three bills require a one week (5 day)
waiting period before receiving program benefits and have
the same covered workforce, which excludes all federal
and local government workers and allows self-employed
workers to opt into the program. The estimates do not differ
if contributions are paid for by the employer, the employee,
or some combination of both.13

Table 1 summarizes key policy parameters of the House
bill, the Senate bill, and the Initiative Petition. These
three proposed PFML programs differ from each other
in terms of eligibility requirements, weekly benefit cap,
maximum weeks of leave, wage replacement rate, and wage
contributions to the program.
The House bill and the Initiative Petition use Massachusetts’
Unemployment Insurance eligibility requirements which
roughly translate into the requirement of having worked
15 weeks and earned $4,300 over the previous year. The
Senate bill requires 1,250 hours worked in Massachusetts
for the previous year, a requirement similar to that of the
FMLA.11 The Senate bill and the Initiative Petition provide
workers with 90 percent (.9 replacement rate) of their weekly
earnings replaced while on leave, up to a maximum of
$1,000 a week. They both allow up to 26 weeks of medical
leave (for own health, including pregnancy reasons) and
16 weeks of family leave (to bond with a new child or care
for an ill relative), with a cap of 26 weeks per year. All of the
bills rely on a percentage of payroll to fund the program.
The Senate bill and the Initiative Petition apply the same
payroll contribution limit used for Social Security (Old Age,
Survivors, and Disability Insurance), which is adjusted by
the federal government. For these estimates, we use the 2015
cap ($118,500) as that year best corresponds to the ACS data
used.12 The House bill uses a sliding scale replacement rate
based on the statewide average weekly wage (AWW), which
was $1256.47 in 2015. While on leave, workers would receive
90% (.9) of their first $397 (i.e. 30% of AWW) of weekly salary
earned plus 33% (.33) of every additional dollar earned up
to a total of $650 per week. The House bill has a maximum
leave time of 26 weeks for medical leaves and 12 weeks for

Estimated Costs
Table 2 includes the total number of workers in the covered
workforce, estimated total costs of the three programs,
average weekly cost per worker (total cost divided by total
number in covered workforce), cost as a percent of the
total wage payroll subject to contribution of the covered
workforce, average weekly benefit paid, total number of
leaves eligible and covered by the PFML program, and
number of leaves as a percent of the covered workforce.
The costs vary from a total of just under $620 million
to about $950 million, with an average annual cost per
worker ranging from $175 to $269, and an average weekly
contribution of $3.37 to $5.16. In each of the three programs
these costs would be split between employer and employee.
Contribution rates, or the percentage of wages withheld
needed to pay for program benefits, are determined by
the dollar value of the annual payroll base divided by the
estimated annual total cost.14 These rates range from 0.33%
in the House bill to 0.55% in the Senate bill and 0.61% for
the Initiative Petition. The average weekly benefit ranges
from $481 in the House bill to $748 in the Senate bill. The
estimates of the number of leaves taken over a year that

Table 1. PFML Program Policy Parameters
House Bill (H. 2172)

Senate Bill (S. 1048)

2018 Initiative Petition

15 weeks worked and
$4,300 earned

1,250 hours worked

15 weeks worked and
$4,300 earned

$650

$1,000

$1,000

Maximum weeks - Medical leave

26

26

26

Maximum weeks - Family leave

12

16

16

Weekly wage replacement rate

.9 to 30% of AWW*; then .33

0.9

0.9

1 week

1 week

1 week

All private sector employees;
state government employees;
self-employed

All private sector employees;
state government employees;
self-employed

All private sector employees;
state government employees;
self-employed

All wages

Up to $118,500**

Up to $118,500**

Eligibility (weeks, hours, and/or earnings
in Massachusetts over previous year)
Maximum weekly benefit payment

Waiting period
Employees covered
Wages subject to contribution

*AWW is the statewide average weekly wage which was $1,256.47 as of October 2015.
**This is the maximum amount subject to Social Security (Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance) payroll contribution in 2015 and 2016.
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Table 2. Total Estimated Program Costs and Usage
House Bill
(H. 2172)

Senate Bill
(S. 1048)

2018 Initiative
Petition

3,534,331

3,534,331

3,534,331

$619.0

$867.6

$949.2

Average yearly cost per worker*

$175

$245

$269

Average weekly cost per worker

$3.37

$4.72

$5.16

Payroll contribution rate**

0.33%

0.55%

0.61%

Average weekly benefit paid

$481

$748

$700

144,000

126,500

147,400

4.1%

3.6%

4.2%

Covered employees
Cost of program (in millions)

Annual program leaves
Program leaves as percentage
of employment

*Total cost/covered workforce
**All wages are subject to contributions in the House bill. Contributions in the Senate
bill and Initiative Petition are based on wages earned up to $118,500.

The main reasons why the costs and
average weekly benefits vary among the
three programs relate to differing eligibility
requirements, maximum benefits, and
replacement rates. The House bill and
Initiative Petition, using UI eligibility rules,
include more part-time workers than the
Senate bill’s requirement of 1,250 annual
hours of employment. As a result, fewer
people are eligible and then use the program
in the Senate bill so the cost is lower than
the Initiative Petition, but those who are
eligible have higher income resulting in a
higher average weekly benefit.16 The lower
maximum benefit paid as well as the sliding
scale in the House bill result in a lower total
cost and lower average benefit than the other
two programs.

Notes: Data are based on September 2, 2017 version of ACM/IWPR Paid Family and
Medical Leave Simulation Model.
Estimated costs provided do not include administrative costs.

Table 2 includes the average weekly costs and
benefits paid. In order to better understand
the contribution and benefit levels for
particular workers, Table 3 provides the total
annual and weekly contribution owed and benefit received
by: 1) a worker who receives the median weekly earnings
of the covered workforce;17 2) a full-time (40-hour a week)
minimum wage worker; and 3) someone earning $118,500 a
year. The 2011-2015 Massachusetts ACS indicates that 8.6%
of the covered workforce earns $118,500 or more while 29.4%
earn less than $440 a week (40 hours at $11/hour).

would be covered under the new PFML programs range
from 126,500 under the Senate bill to 144,000 under the
House bill, and 147,400 under the Initiative Petition.
Program leaves represent between 3.6% and 4.2% of the total
covered workforce. Since some workers take more than one
leave in a year, the percentage of covered employees taking a
leave is between 3.0% and 3.5%. While there are many more
leaves taken, only between 21 and 25 percent of those leaves
would be covered under any of these PFML programs. There
are many reasons why the majority of leave takers would not
use a statewide PFML program. Most leaves are short (half
of all leaves are for three weeks or less), some employees may
have better coverage from their employer, and others might
not apply because their leave patterns are unpredictable (as
are many ill relative leaves) or because of lack of knowledge
of the program.15

Median Wage Earners
The total weekly contribution for a worker earning the
median weekly wage of $776.60 ranges from $2.59 in
the House bill to $4.70 in the Initiative Petition. If the
contributions were paid equally by the employer and the
employee, each would be making an annual contribution
of $67.50 (half of $135) to $122 ($244 divided by two). The

Table 3. Annual and Weekly Contribution and Weekly Benefit for Median Earner,
Full-time Minimum Wage Earner, and Worker Earning $118,500 Annually
Median Wage Earner
($776.60 per week)

Minimum Wage Earner
($11/hour, 40 hours/week)

Worker with Annual Earnings of
$118,500

Annual
contribution

Weekly
contribution

Weekly
benefit

Annual
contribution

Weekly
contribution

Weekly
benefit

Annual
contribution

Weekly
contribution

Weekly
benefit

House Bill
(H. 2172)

$135

$2.59

$471

$76

$1.47

$360

$396

$7.61

$650

Senate Bill
(S. 1048)

$223

$4.30

$699

$127

$2.43

$396

$655

$12.60

$1,000

Initiative
Petition

$244

$4.70

$699

$138

$2.66

$396

$717

$13.79

$1,000

Notes: Data are based on the September 2, 2017 version of the ACM/IWPR Paid Family and Medical Leave Simulation. Model. These dollar
amounts are the total contribution made by both employer and employee. Calculations are based on contribution rates in Table 2. The
annual contribution of median and minimum wage earnings are calculated by multiplying weekly rate by 52.
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worker earning the median weekly wage of $776.60 would
receive $471 (61% of that wage) a week under the House bill
and $699 (90% of that wage) under the Senate bill and the
Initiative Petition.

Table 4. Number of PFML Program Leaves, Average
Leave Length while on Program, and Percent of All
Leaves with Any Wage Replacement, by Leave Type
House Bill
(H. 2172)

Minimum Wage Workers
The weekly cost for a full-time minimum wage worker
covered in the program would be between $1.47 and $2.66
a week. If split equally among employer and employee, that
amounts to an annual contribution of $38 to $69 by each.
Weekly benefits when eligible and on the PFML program
for a full-time minimum wage worker earning $440 a week
under the House bill would be $360 and only slightly higher
at $396 under the Senate bill and the Initiative Petition.

Senate Bill
(S. 1048)

2018
Initiative
Petition

Program leaves taken
Own health

87,500

78,500

89,900

Pregnancy

25,700

20,700

26,000

New child

27,500

24,600

28,200

Ill relative

3,300

2,700

3,300

All leaves

144,000

126,500

147,400

Average weeks of leave on program

Workers Earning $118,500 (Maximum amount subject to
Social Security payroll contribution)
The weekly cost for a worker earning an annual salary of
$118,500 (which would also be the contribution cap under
the Senate bill and the Initiative Petition) ranges from $7.61
to $13.79 a week (or $198 to $359 annually when split equally
between employer and employee). The worker earning
$118,500 annually ($2,280 weekly) would get the maximum
benefit under all three programs: $650 which would be 23%
of that worker’s weekly wage and $1,000 which would be
44% of the weekly wage.

Own health

11.0

11.3

11.3

Pregnancy

14.3

14.6

14.5

New child

6.4

6.9

7.2

Ill relative

3.1

3.2

3.3

All leaves

10.5

10.8

10.9

Percent of leaves with wage replaced

Coverage in PFML Programs
Table 4 provides simulator estimates of the number of
people who would use the PFML program, the average
length of time on the program, and the percentage of
workers who would receive any form of wage replacement
by the type of leave taken. The vast majority of leaves (about
61 percent) taken using any of the PFML programs are
for non-pregnancy own-health related reasons, followed
by leaves for a new child (19 percent), pregnancy (about
17 percent) and to care for an ill relative (2 percent). We
estimate the average length of leave using the program for
all leaves to be between 10.5 and 10.9 weeks. Pregnancy
leaves are the longest at about 14.5 weeks, followed by own
health leaves at just over 11 weeks. Ill-relative leaves are, on
average, the shortest.

Own health

79.3%

77.6%

79.3%

Pregnancy

93.5%

89.3%

93.5%

New child

94.6%

90.8%

94.5%

Ill relative

75.1%

75.0%

75.2%

All leaves

80.4%

78.8%

80.4%

Note: Data provided here uses the September 2, 2017 version of
ACM/IWPR Paid Family and Medical Leave Simulation Model.

access to short-term disability leave, and 68% had paid sick
leave.18 While our simulator relies on DOL survey data and
allows us to determine if a worker on a family or medical
leave19 received any wage replacement, we cannot use the
survey to estimate what form that pay takes. Therefore, the
wage replacement estimates in Table 4 include workers who
use vacation days, paid sick days, a disability insurance
policy, employer paid family or medical leave, and with the
proposed PFML program.
As depicted in Table 5, without a statewide program
in place, the simulator estimates that 73.1% of workers
have some form of wage replacement. The House bill and
Initiative Petition boost that average to 80.4% while the
Senate bill increases access to paid leave to 78.8% of all
workers on leave.

The last section in Table 4 provides the percentage of all
workers who have any form of wage replacement while
on a family or medical leave in the presence of each of
these PFML programs. Currently in Massachusetts paid
family leave and short-term medical leave for a serious
health condition or pregnancy are provided by individual
employers that choose to provide this benefit, through
union negotiated contracts, or through privately purchased
short-term disability insurance policies. This leaves many
workers uncovered. In 2016, only 14% of all U.S. workers had
access to paid family leave from their employers, 38% had

One of the most important reasons to implement a
statewide paid family leave program is to provide this
crucial work-related benefit to cover workers who need
to take an extended paid family or medical leave but
currently have no access to paid leave or insufficient
coverage. A troubling aspect of the current landscape of
wage-replacement for workers who take family and medical
5

leave is that they are available unevenly across employers
and employees. Three groups of workers are particularly at
risk of not being covered. This includes female employees,
because they are more likely than male employees to take
a leave, especially for a new child. The other two groups are
low-wage workers (who tend to younger, non-white, and
low-income) and workers employed by smaller companies.
Employers prefer to provide this benefit to attract and keep
higher wage workers, while many small firms tend to have
less capacity to offer this benefit to all of its workers.

be covered with wage replacement under each of the
three PFML programs. Black, Latinx, young, poor, near
poor, and low-wage workers as well as those who work for
small-sized firms are the least likely to currently have any
forms of wage replacement, with rates typically at least ten
percentage points below the average. All three programs
provide a larger boost in access for these workers than their
counterparts, narrowing the gap between those with and
those without any paid family or medical leave. And while
the gap between male and female workers is not wide, the
House bill and the Initiative Petition provide near parity.

Table 5 depicts the percentage of workers by various
worker characteristics currently covered and who would

Table 5. Percent of Workers with Any Wage Replacement by Characteristic of Worker,
At Present and Under Proposed PFML Programs
Currently

House Bill
(H. 2172)

Senate Bill
(S. 1048)

2018 Initiative
Petition

73.1%

80.4%

78.8%

80.4%

Male

75.1%

81.0%

80.1%

81.2%

Female

71.5%

79.8%

77.6%

79.8%

Percent of Wage Replaced
Total
Sex

Race
White

74.6%

81.3%

79.7%

81.4%

Black

65.5%

75.2%

73.4%

75.6%

Asian or Pacific Islander

75.4%

82.0%

81.3%

82.0%

Latino

61.0%

73.1%

70.3%

73.3%

16-24

41.2%

53.5%

48.8%

53.4%

25-44

73.4%

82.6%

80.9%

82.6%

45-64

79.9%

84.4%

83.6%

84.6%

65 & older

68.8%

75.1%

72.4%

75.2%

Above median

85.1%

89.1%

88.5%

89.3%

At or below median

60.0%

71.0%

68.2%

71.0%

Below Federal Poverty Level (FPL)

26.4%

43.0%

35.5%

43.5%

Between 100-199% FPL

51.4%

67.2%

62.7%

67.2%

200% FPL & above

79.2%

84.9%

83.9%

84.9%

Earns $15 or more

79.8%

85.5%

84.3%

85.7%

Earns less than $15

57.5%

68.4%

65.9%

68.5%

1-9 employees

62.1%

72.1%

69.6%

72.1%

10-49 employees

62.1%

73.1%

70.9%

72.8%

Age group

Family income level

Poverty level

Hourly wage level

Employer size

50-99 employees

75.2%

81.8%

80.3%

82.1%

100-499 employees

75.7%

82.3%

80.9%

82.1%

500 or more employees

77.0%

83.3%

81.9%

83.5%

Note: Data are based on the September 2, 2017 version of ACM/IWPR Paid Family and Medical Leave Simulation Model.
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Policy Trade-offs

Balancing Coverage and Costs

In conclusion, each of the proposed PFML programs provide
for more universal coverage for workers with their own
serious health conditions, those giving birth, those bonding
with a newly born or adopted child, and those caring for
an ill relative. And each does so by spreading and sharing
the costs across most of the Massachusetts workforce. The
programs do, however, vary by costs as well as coverage
highlighting the trade-offs involved in designing a program.

All three proposed paid family and medical leave programs
contain elements that achieve the key policy goal of
extending wage replacement that allow families to balance
work, family, and medical needs. To do so will cost money,
but even after taking into account administrative costs, we
estimate that the total cost will be less than one percent
of total payroll. Taking the various trade-offs into account
and placing the highest priority on coverage followed by
cost, some combination of the three proposed programs,
in our opinion, would strike the right balance. Specifically,
we suggest usage of the eligibility requirements of the
House bill and the Initiative Petition programs of 15 weeks
worked and $4,300 (earned in the last year); applying a more
generous sliding scale to the weeks covered in the House
bill (26 for medical and 12 for family leave), and utilizing the
maximum benefit of $1,000 a week contained in the Senate
bill and the Initiative Petition. This combination would
assure broad-based coverage for workers in need, provide
adequate wage replacement, and still remain affordable.

It is important to consider the following differences in the
proposed paid family and medical leave programs now
under consideration by the legislature:
Eligibility Requirements
• The broader the eligibility requirements, the more
workers receive coverage; the more workers covered,
the higher the costs.
Wage Replacement Rates and Maximum Benefit
• The higher the wage replacement rate and the higher
the maximum benefit, the greater the number of
program users and longer length of usage, resulting in
higher costs.
• Evidence from elsewhere indicates that low-wage
workers, some of the workers with the least amount
of coverage now, are much more likely to use a paid
leave program if the replacement rate is high.20 A
sliding scale replacement schedule would allow for
higher replacement rates for lower-waged workers
which would increase their participation and reduce
the overall cost of a program.
Leave Length Maximum
• The higher the maximum number of weeks allowed,
the higher the costs. All three programs provide 26
weeks of medical leave which would cover the vast
majority of current medical leaves and is consistent
with paid medical leaves in the states that already
have a program.21 Gauging the appropriate length
for family leaves is more challenging. The most
predictable of these leaves is to bond with a new child
and each of these bills provide 12 to 16 weeks of family
leave. Nonetheless, in the states with paid family leave
programs, far fewer workers use paid family leave
programs than they do medical leaves, which implies
that the number of weeks allowed will not be a large
cost driver.
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The OECD Database publishes information about paid parental and ill relative leave arrangements in all the OECD countries at www.
oecd.org/social/family/database.htm. See PF2.1 Key characteristics of parental leave systems and PF2.3 Additional leave entitlements of
working parents for a country-by-country description of leave provisions. In an extensive survey of legislation in 22 OECD countries,
Jody Heymann, Hye Jin Rho, John Schmitt, and Alison Earle find that the United States is the only country that has no guaranteed paid
sick leave. (Contagion Nation: A Comparison of Paid Sick Day Policies in 22 Countries, Washington DC: Center for Economic and Policy
Research at http://cepr.net/documents/publications/paid-sick-days-2009-05.pdf, retrieved December 1, 2015).
The states that currently have paid family and medical leave programs are California, New Jersey and Rhode Island. Hawaii and New
York have a paid medical leave insurance program. New York recently enacted paid family leave. Washington DC and Washington state
also recently enacted paid family and medical leave legislation.
For a summary of the benefits associated with paid leave see Barbara Gault et al. Paid Parental Leave in the United States: What the Data
Tell Us About Access, Usage, and Economic and Health Benefits, Institute for Women’s Policy Research, January 23, 2014 https://iwpr.org/
publications/paid-parental-leave-in-the-united-states-what-the-data-tell-us-about-access-usage-and-economic-and-health-benefits;
and AEI-Brookings Working Group on Paid Family Leave, Paid Family and Medical Leave: An Issue Whose Time Has Come, American
Enterprise Institute and Brookings Institution, May 2017 www.brookings.edu/research/paid-family-and-medical-leave-an-issue-whosetime-has-come.
New York and Hawaii (with only a paid medical leave program) rely on private insurers while all the other states administer their own
programs. A Better Balance maintains a comprehensive and up-to-date list of the parameters of state programs at www.abetterbalance.
org/resources/paid-family-leave-laws-chart.
These costs as well as start-up costs are beyond the scope of what the simulator is designed to do. Administration costs will depend on
which entity runs the program, the amount of outreach performed, and to some degree the parameters of the program itself.
Jacob Alex Klerman, Kelly Daley, and Alyssa Pozniak, Family and Medical Leave in 2012: Technical Report, Abt Associates, prepared for the
U.S. Department of Labor (2013).
Due to small sample sizes and lack of information on state of residence or work, the publicly provided data from the DOL survey does
not allow an accurate measure of leave lengths for those leave takers who use one of the already existing statewide programs. The model
was updated in 2016 to allow the user various ways to extend leave lengths that better approximate lengths observed in states with
paid family and medical leaves as well as to change the probability of taking a leave with a program in place. These estimates reflect
that update and as such leave lengths using the program that are longer than estimated in previous versions of the model and better
approximate those of states with paid medical leaves.
This is done by running the simulator under various take-up rates and extension of leave options for those states using parameters of
their existing programs and using those that are within the ranges that best approximate actual numbers of leaves and leave lengths.
There is some evidence that firms do this. In addition, a 2015 Paid Family Leave Market Research report on California’s Paid Family
Leave program conducted for California’s Employment Development Department (www.edd.ca.gov/disability/pdf/Paid_Family_Leave_
Market_Research_Report_2015.pdf) finds that between 40%- 50% of women taking paid family leave with incomes over $60,000 used
“integrated” benefits – a combination of program and employer pay (p. 41).
In addition, a “cloning” device is used to reduce simulation error by creating several duplicates of the same person to run through the
simulation. A cloning factor of 30 is used for the estimations here (i.e. each person is run through the model 30 independent times, with
the weight of each person reduced by a factor of 30). This reduces the variability of estimates for any given run of the model which uses
a “random wheel” spin for probabilities of taking and needing a leave. Still, there will be some variability in results across runs of the
simulator, but typically less than 1 percent.
Eligibility for the FMLA is more stringent in that it requires workers be employed with the same employer for 1,250 hours and that
employer must employ 50 or more employees within a 75-mile radius.
The cap in 2016 was also $118,500. However, the 2017 cap rose to $127,200. Using this value reduces the contribution rate in the Senate bill
and the Initiative Petition by .009%.
Limitation in the DOL survey and the ACS do not allow us to incorporate broader definitions of family members beyond parent, spouse
and child.
This only accounts for the costs of benefit payment and does not include any administration costs.
Other reasons why this occurs are discussed in our 2016 report, It’s About Time: Cost and Coverage of Paid Family Leave in Massachusetts.
The simulation model estimates that 87.5% of all covered workers would be eligible for the House bill and the Initiative Petition PFML
programs, while 73.3% of all covered workers would be eligible under the Senate bill. This assumes that all self-employed workers are
among the covered workforce (i.e. making contributions) and would be eligible.
Determined using the ACS 2011-2015.
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Compensation Survey, 2016, Tables 16 and 32. Retrieved September 15,
2017 at www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2016/ownership_civilian.htm.
As defined by the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).
Eileen Appelbaum and Ruth Milkman, Leaves That Pay: Employer and Worker Experiences with Paid Family Leave in California Center for
Economic and Policy Research, 2011, http://cepr.net/documents/publications/paid-family-leave-1-2011.pdf.
We estimate that 9% of those receiving program benefits take a medical leave that is longer than 26 weeks.
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